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SUMMARY
The impact of market concentration has been little studied in markets for ambulatory care in the
developing world, where the retail sector often accounts for a high proportion of treatments. This
study begins to address this gap through an analysis of the consumer market for malaria treatment
in rural areas of three districts in Tanzania. We developed methods for investigating market
definition, sales volumes and concentration, and used these to explore the relationship between
antimalarial retail prices and competition.
The market was strongly geographically segmented and highly concentrated in terms of
antimalarial sales. Antimalarial prices were positively associated with market concentration. High
antimalarial prices were likely to be an important factor in the low proportion of care seekers
obtaining appropriate treatment.
Retail sector distribution of subsidised antimalarials has been proposed to increase the coverage of
effective treatment, but this analysis indicates that local market power may prevent such subsidies
from being passed on to rural customers. Policymakers should consider the potential to maintain
lower retail prices by decreasing concentration among antimalarial providers and recommending
retail price levels.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Health-care market concentration is potentially a key influence on the price, coverage and
quality of services provided. However, there is a lack of evidence on concentration in
markets for ambulatory care in the developing world. The majority of the literature concerns
US hospitals (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000), with a smaller literature on other developed
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countries, such as the UK and New Zealand (Ashton and Press, 1997; Propper and
Soderlund, 1998; Roberts, 1993), and a few studies of hospital markets in developing
countries (Amin, 2002; Bennett, 1996; Ginson-Bautista, 1995; Muraleedharan, 1999;
Nakamba et al., 2002). The non-hospital sector is far less studied, especially in low-income
settings, although it is the main source of treatment for pervasive and potentially fatal
diseases such as diarrhoea, tuberculosis, acute respiratory infection and malaria.
These non-hospital markets are quite unlike those in most developed countries. The private
sector is a very common source of treatment (Mills et al., 2002; Waters et al., 2003), and
retailers account for a high proportion of care (Berman, 2000; Brugha and Zwi, 1999;
McCombie, 2002; Uplekar et al., 1998). For example, in a review of sub-Saharan African
literature, the median percentage of care-seekers using shops during recent childhood illness
was around 50% (Goodman et al., 2007a). It is increasingly recognised that to reduce the
disease burden for common and serious health problems, governments must look beyond the
public sector, and work with retailers to improve the coverage and quality of care obtained
(Brugha et al., 1999; WHO, 2005).
Understanding the nature of competition facing retail providers is an important first step in
the design of appropriate and effective strategies. In this study, we address this issue in the
context of the market for malaria treatment in rural Tanzania. Treatment for malaria is
highly inadequate; in 2002 only 20% of Tanzanian children with malarial symptoms
obtained appropriate treatment within 24 h, in contrast to a target of 60% set by African
Heads of State (Malaria Consortium, 2004). Moreover, the development of resistance to
commonly used antimalarials has led to the adoption of artemisinin-based combination
therapies (ACT) which are highly effective but much more costly (Bosman and Mendis,
2007). In 2004 a committee on the economics of antimalarials led by Kenneth Arrow argued
that without heavy ACT subsidies in the public and private sectors, coverage of effective
treatment would remain unacceptably low. This suggestion is now being further developed
by the international public health community (Enserink, 2007).
This study analysed the nature of competition in the malaria treatment market in order to
inform policy on increasing coverage of appropriate treatment, and in particular, consider
the implications of the subsidies recommended by the Arrow committee for the African
retail sector.
2. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
The study drew on the structure–conduct–performance paradigm, exploring the
interrelationship between market structure and provider conduct and the implications for
market outcomes, which in public health terms encompass the price, coverage and quality of
care. Broadly speaking, more concentrated market structures are hypothesised to be
associated with greater market power, less price competition, and higher prices and profits
(Demsetz, 1973). However, it is widely recognised that the direction of causation between
structure and conduct is two way (Scherer, 1970; Waterson, 1984), and that the nature of
competition is shaped by potential competition, or contestability, as well as current levels of
market concentration (Baumol et al., 1982).
Empirical work in the health economics field has used econometric techniques to investigate
the relationship between concentration and measures of price, costs and quality. However,
the definition and measurement of markets and concentration entail a number of
methodological and empirical challenges. Tirole defines a market as the group of sellers and
buyers of a set of products who are in sufficiently close contact for their transactions to
affect the terms on which the others buy or sell (Tirole, 1988). However, in practice the
delineation of both product range and geographical area is open to debate (Zwanziger et al.,
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1994). In healthcare a key decision is the degree of aggregation in product definition, which
for hospital markets has ranged from a single procedure to a group of specialities (Ashton
and Press, 1997; Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). Geographical market definition may be based on
political boundaries, fixed radii or shipment methods, all of which have their weaknesses.
Political boundaries and fixed radii are straightforward methods, but may ignore
geographical boundaries, ease of travel and the nature of population centres (Luft and
Maerki, 1984). The shipment method uses utilisation data by patient origin to define the
market area by minimising the proportion of customers who travel outside the area to
purchase the product, and maximising the proportion who remain within the area (Gaynor
and Vogt, 2000). However, the cut-off points for these proportions are essentially arbitrary,
and the resulting boundaries may not reflect contestability.
Market concentration has both horizontal and vertical dimensions. A market has higher
horizontal concentration the fewer the number of firms in production or the more unequal
the distribution of market shares (Clarke, 1985). Horizontal concentration may be
summarised by absolute measures, which relate to both firm numbers and relative market
shares, and inequality measures that consider only the dispersion of market shares. Absolute
measures are more widely used, with the most common being the concentration ratio and the
Hirschman–Herfindahl index (HHI). The concentration ratio, the proportion of output
accounted for by the r largest firms, is simple to calculate and interpret but considers only
the r largest firms in the industry, and the choice of r is arbitrary. The HHI, the sum of
squared firm market shares of all firms in the industry, takes account of both market share
inequality and firm numbers. Both measures allow for comparison between markets, but
neither provides clear guidance on whether a market should be considered concentrated in
absolute terms nor incorporates contestability. For vertical integration, the extent to which a
single business unit carries out successive stages in the processing and distribution of a
product, standardised measures do not exist.
In non-hospital markets in developing countries, these measurement problems are
compounded by lack of routine data. Official records on the number and location of private
outlets are frequently out-of-date and inaccurate, and few retailers keep regular sales
records, let alone data on the characteristics and area of residence of customers. Moreover,
methods for studying the behaviour of retail providers remain relatively under-developed,
and particularly lack adaptation for informal outlets (Conteh and Hanson, 2003).
This study aimed to address these methodological and empirical challenges in the context of
the malaria treatment market in three rural districts in Tanzania. As far as we are aware it is
the first to apply these methodological techniques to the retail market for drugs in the
developing world.
3. BACKGROUND
Tanzania is one of the world’s poorest countries, with a gross national income per capita of
$280 at the time of the study in 2002 (World Bank, 2008). Post-independence, Tanzania
followed a broadly socialist economic model, but the private sector has expanded rapidly
since economic liberalisation began in the mid-1980s. The health sector has been no
exception, with a mushrooming of commercial private facilities and laboratories in urban
areas, and an increase in retail drug sales throughout the country (Munishi et al., 1995).
The whole population of Tanzania is at risk of malaria (de Savigny et al., 2004), which is the
leading cause of outpatient and inpatient health service attendance, and estimated to account
for 100 000-125 000 deaths per year, of which 80 000 are in children under 5 years of age
(National Malaria Control Programme, 2003). Mild or ‘uncomplicated’ malaria involves
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symptoms such as fever, chills, headache and nausea, but can rapidly progress to severe
disease, which has a high case fatality rate (Greenwood et al., 1987).
Treatment for uncomplicated malaria can be obtained from health-care facilities and retail
outlets. The facilities comprise government and private hospitals, health centres and smaller
dispensaries, where patients receive a consultation, possibly a laboratory test, and drugs. In
rural areas private facilities are generally mission-owned. Drugs are also widely available
without consultation from pharmacies, drug stores and general shops, though pharmacies are
rare in rural areas. Care-seekers frequently choose such outlets over government health
facilities because retailers are more accessible, have longer opening hours, provide quicker
service, have more reliable drug stocks, and are perceived as relatively courteous and
approachable (Williams and Jones, 2004). Drug shops sell a wide range of over-the-counter
medicines, including painkillers. antimalarials and antibiotics (although the latter are not
permitted in these outlets). Nearly all drug shops are commercially owned, though in a few
places community-owned ‘village-run’ drug stores had been established. General shops
range from large shops to small roadside stalls, typically stocking a mixture of food products
and household goods, and a few medicines, such as common painkillers and the occasional
antimalarial. Government facilities are either free or highly subsidised, but fees are charged
by all private facilities and shops. Payment is generally made out-of-pocket by consumers,
with very low coverage of health insurance or prepayment.
Patients are generally treated presumptively, on the basis of fever alone, although many
febrile patients are not parasitaemic. The recommended treatment consists of a course of
antimalarials, supplemented by antipyretics to help reduce fever and pain. Until 2001 the
main antimalarial used was chloroquine, but high levels of chloroquine resistance led to its
official withdrawal and replacement by sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP), with
amodiaquine as second line, and quinine as third line and first choice in severe malaria. In
2006, SP was in turn replaced by ACT, but the latter was not in use at the time of the study.
Oral amodiaquine was the only antimalarial that drug and general stores were officially
allowed to sell, but stocking of others such as quinine, SP and artesunate was widespread.
4. METHODS
4.1. Data sources
This study formed part of the Interdisciplinary Monitoring Project for Antimalarial
Combination Therapy in the three rural districts of Kilombero, Ulanga and Rufiji in
southeastern Tanzania. The main economic activity is subsistence farming, supplemented by
limited cash-cropping. Data were collected in the areas of each district covered by
demographic surveillance systems (DSS), which contained populations of 73 839 in Rufiji
and 66 503 in Kilombero/Ulanga in mid-2001. There are no towns in the DSS areas,
although Ifakara Town is located a few kilometres from the start of Ulanga and Kilombero
DSS areas. Government facilities were officially free in Rufiji, but in Kilombero and Ulanga
user fees had been introduced in dispensaries (but not in health centres).
Data collection activities are summarised in Table I. Data on household demand for fever/
malaria treatment were collected using a household survey. A relative index of household
socio-economic status was derived using principal components analysis (Filmer and
Pritchett, 2001; McKenzie, 2003), based on 19 variables, covering household construction,
utilities and asset ownership (Njau et al., 2006). A census of all private sources of
manufactured drugs in the DSS areas was conducted in 2000 and 2001, covering facilities,
drug stores and general shops (Goodman et al., 2004). Representative data on antimalarial
stocks and prices were collected through an outlet survey.
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Retail audit methods were used to measure antimalarial sales in all public and private
facilities and drug shops and a sample of general stores stocking antimalarials. Data were
collected during two separate rounds, as providers reported that drug sales varied by day of
the week and time of year, but that there was little intra-month variation in weekly sales.
During each round, interviewers visited each outlet twice, aiming for a 2-week gap between
visits. At both visits they recorded antimalarial stock levels, and at the second visit, any
deliveries since their previous visit, plus any drugs that had been removed for other reasons,
e.g. thrown away, returned to wholesalers or taken to other shops belonging to the same
owner.
4.2. Market definition
Market definition was considered along product and geographical lines. The types of
providers making up the market were defined as those widely used for ‘fever or malaria’
treatment (as initial care-seeking and most treatment were based on clinical symptoms alone,
fever and malaria treatment were not separable). Of 577 visits for fever/malaria recorded in
the household survey, 65% were to shops and 33% to facilities, with retail visits roughly
equally divided between drug shops and general stores. Reported use of traditional healers
and community health workers was very rare, only 0.9 and 0.4% of visits, respectively. The
product definition for providers was therefore set as health-care facilities, drug stores and
general stores, accounting for 98% of provider visits.
For geographical market definition, the suitability of several administrative boundaries was
considered, using the insights of the shipment method to define an area as ‘self-contained’ if
the proportion of the population in the market area using providers outside it was low. Only
4% of fever/malaria visits to facilities, drug stores and general stores took place outside the
DSS area of residence. However, use of the DSS area as the market definition would
overstate market size, as 86% of visits took place in the ward of residence (2-8 villages).
The smaller category of village was inappropriate for market definition as 39% of visits
were to outlets outside the village of residence. The ward was therefore judged the most
appropriate boundary as a starting point for geographical definition, but some adjustments
were made to account for local circumstances. First, data from each ward were analysed to
identify any completely self-contained areas of two or more villages within a ward, which
were then defined as a separate sub-market. Secondly, where over 15% of visits from a
given ward were to another ward, the geographical definition was adjusted to allocate
villages more appropriately. This resulted in five sub-markets in Rufiji DSS, three in
Kilombero, and four in Ulanga, and 93% of visits taking place within the sub-market of
residence.
4.3. Estimation of antimalarial market shares
The drugs obtained were a mixture of painkillers, antimalarials and a few antibiotics. For
estimation of market shares and analysis of price competition we focused on antimalarials,
as they are of greatest public health significance for malaria treatment.
Sales of all antimalarials stocked during each round of the retail audit were calculated as:
To calculate fortnightly sales, volumes were scaled up or down pro rata, depending on the
number of days between interviews. Data were extrapolated to cover antimalarial stockists
not interviewed (estimated to be 76 outlets in the first audit and 69 in the second) and
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antimalarials with missing sales data (13 out of a total of 788 observations) using mean sales
for each drug type by outlet type. Annual sales were estimated by summing the sales figures
for the two surveys and scaling up pro rata. This was deemed appropriate, as the data
showed no clear seasonal patterns between the two rounds.
To sum across different drug types, total antimalarial sales volumes were calculated in terms
of purchases required for equivalent adult treatment doses. The value of private sector
antimalarial sales was approximated based on outlet survey data on the median price for
each drug category by packaging and outlet type (e.g. median price of loose SP tablets in
drug stores).1 We did not attempt to value antimalarials dispensed from government
facilities, as they were either heavily or completely subsidised. Antimalarial market shares
in value and volume terms were then calculated for each sub-market.
4.4. Measures of concentration
Antimalarial market shares were used to measure horizontal concentration in each sub-
market. Government facilities follow models of service provision and prices set
institutionally at the central level, and are therefore unlikely to compete locally. Moreover,
large government facility market shares would have obscured the impact of private sector
concentration on private outlets, which was likely to have been the most important factor
influencing their competitive decisions. Concentration was therefore evaluated using private
sector sales volumes and values, and the 3-firm ratio and the HHI were calculated. Results
were calculated by owner not outlet, as outlets with common ownership were likely to be
run as single businesses. This affected all mission facilities in the DSS areas of Kilombero
and Ulanga, which were owned by the Roman Catholic Church, two of the facilities in Rufiji
owned by the Free Pentecostal Church, and several shop owners with multiple shops.
The impact of market concentration on antimalarial tablet prices was evaluated using
multivariate analysis, controlling for cost and quality variation through proxies based on
outlet and product characteristics.
5. RESULTS
As expected, household survey data demonstrated the inadequacy of current treatment for
fever/malaria. Only 37% of all care-seekers obtained an antimalarial over the course of their
fever/malaria episode, while 39% obtained painkillers only. A third of all antimalarials were
dispensed as under-doses, meaning that only 26% of all care-seekers obtained an adequate
antimalarial dose. For the poorest third of households only 31% obtained an antimalarial and
23% an adequate antimalarial dose, compared with 46 and 35%, respectively in the least
poor third. Private facilities were most likely to dispense antimalarials (antimalarials
dispensed at 68% of private facility visits), followed by drug stores (55% of visits) and
government facilities (52% of visits). General stores were least likely to dispense
antimalarials (12% of visits).
5.1. Market structure
The study areas contained 18 government facilities (4 health centres and 14 smaller
dispensaries), and 9 private facilities (7 mission dispensaries, 1 mission hospital and 1
commercial dispensary). In 2001 there were 32 drug shops, 30 commercially owned, and
two village-run. Drug stores tended to locate relatively close to facilities, and were generally
limited to the more populous areas and main roads. We also identified 535 general retailers
with drugs in stock on the day visited. They were much more dispersed than drug stores,
1Exchange rate on 1/1/2002: US$1
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reaching right out to remote communities. All commercial drug stores, general stores and the
commercial dispensary were run on a for-profit basis, and all government facilities, mission
facilities and village-run drug stores on an officially not-for-profit basis.
There was a high turnover in retail outlets. Of the 23 commercial drug stores operating in
mid-2000, 2 had closed down by mid-2001, while 9 new drug stores had started up.
Turnover among the general retailers was also very high. Over a 1-year period 29% had
closed down, and 7% were open but no longer stocked drugs, while an additional 216
general retailers stocking drugs had opened and 14 existing shops had started stocking
drugs.
Antimalarials were stocked by all facilities and drug stores, but by only 14% of general
stores stocking drugs. The antimalarials available were chloroquine, SP, amodiaquine,
quinine and artesunate, in a mixture of tablet, syrup and injectable formulations. The total
number of antimalarial products identified during the outlet survey was 81, of which 47
were branded and 34 unbranded. Private facilities had the widest choice, with a median of
seven antimalarial products, compared with six in drug shops, five in government facilities
and only one in general stores that stocked antimalarials. General shops and village-run drug
stores usually had only chloroquine, whereas SP, amodiaquine and quinine were frequently
found in facilities and commercial drug stores, and many commercial drug stores stocked
several brands of each antimalarial type.
From the antimalarial retail audits it was estimated that 233 606 equivalent adult
antimalarial doses were dispensed per annum from all facilities and shops in the DSS areas,
equivalent to 1.7 adult doses per capita. SP and amodiaquine accounted for 69 and 17% of
antimalarial volumes. No other antimalarial type was responsible for more than 5% of total
sales volumes. In volume terms, the private sector supplied 58% of antimalarials, mostly
through the retail sector, which accounted for 39%.
The total value of antimalarials dispensed in the private sector was estimated at US$97 844
per annum, equivalent to $0.69 per capita. The retail sector accounted for 67% of private
sector sales values, and within that, commercial drug stores supplied 90% of antimalarials in
all areas. The average value of antimalarials sold in commercial drug stores was US$1731
per shop per year, compared with US$871 in village-run drug stores, and only US$38 in
general stores stocking antimalarials.
5.2. Antimalarial prices
Price data are presented for tablet formulations of the most common antimalarial types
(chloroquine, SP, amodiaquine and quinine), which together made up over 95% of total
antimalarial sales volumes. Table II shows prices for a 2-year-old child’s dose by drug and
outlet type. Village-run drug stores were excluded from the price analysis as there were only
two, making it difficult to generalise from their results, and both were in the same sub-
market, so were practical options for only 10% of the study population.
For all antimalarials, which they supplied, the three government facilities reporting charging
drug fees had the lowest median price and since the remaining 15 government facilities did
not report charging for drugs, on average government facilities should be the cheapest
source in terms of antimalarial prices.
Drug stores tended to be more expensive than private facilities, with higher median prices
for 7 of the 10 antimalarials. The relative prices of general stores compared with facilities
and drug stores did not follow a clear pattern, although the scope for comparison was limited
by the small number of observations. For chloroquine tablets, the most frequently stocked
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antimalarial in general stores, the median price was significantly higher in general stores
than in all other outlet types.
Although facility antimalarial prices were generally lower than those in drug stores, total
expenditure per patient would in some cases have been higher. In 7 out of the 18
government facilities and 4 out of 8 private facilities consumers also paid non-drug fees for
registration, consultation, laboratory tests or contributions for kerosene. Non-drug charges
for an adult ranged from $0.05 to $0.42 in government facilities (median $0.11 where
charged), and $0.21 to $1.16 in private facilities (median $0.53 where charged).
In a market characterised by strong price competition one would expect uniform prices for
given products, but this was not the case. Table III shows the total price range in drug shops,
interquartile range and quartile coefficient of variation, a non-parametric dispersion measure
standardised by absolute price (Owen and Jones, 1990). The evidence indicates considerable
price variation for each drug type with, for example, the price of a child’s dose of packaged
SP tablets ranging from $0.18 to $0.79, and of packaged amodiaquine tablets from $0.11 to
$0.42. Only chloroquine, historically the most established antimalarial, was sold at a
uniform price.
5.3. Concentration
Table IV reports market concentration by sub-market area for private sector antimalarial
sales volumes and values. For volumes, the 3-firm ratio ranged from 68 to 100%, and the
HHI from 0.18 to 1 (mean of 0.45). If sales values were considered, the concentration ratio
and the HHI increased across nearly all sub-markets. The HHI and 3-firm ratio gave similar
indications of relative concentration, with a correlation coefficient between the two
measures across sub-markets of 0.88 for sales volumes (t-test, p<0.001), and 0.79 for sales
values (t-test p = 0.002).
The variation in concentration across sub-markets did not appear to reflect crowding-out of
the private sector in areas with superior government facilities. All sub-markets contained at
least one government facility, and those with the higher-level health centres (Mchombe,
Lupiro, Ikwiriri and Kibiti) did not have systematically higher concentration than those with
government dispensaries only. There was no significant relationship across sub-markets
between the HHI by private volumes or values and average socio-economic status, as
measured by the percentage of households in the poorest third.
The influence of market concentration on antimalarial prices charged by drug and general
stores was explored using regression analysis. A log-linear regression model for the price of
a child’s dose of antimalarial tablets is specified in Table V. Natural logs were taken of the
dependent variable to reflect the skewed price distribution. It was regressed on market
concentration as measured by the HHI in the sub-market, a dummy variable for district, and
a number of outlet and drug characteristics as proxies for variations in cost and quality. The
cost and perceived quality of drugs were represented using four proxies which shopkeepers
reported customers to associate with effective medicines: antimalarial type, type of
packaging, country of manufacture and brand status. Outlet type was included to capture
differences between drug and general shops in perceived quality of service, overhead costs
and wholesale prices. Outlet location was potentially a proxy for accessibility for consumers
and the cost of wholesale deliveries. The STATA version 10 svyregress command was used
to allow for clustering of drug prices within shops, and the strata were defined as the sub-
markets at which level the HHI was calculated (Stata Inc., 2003). Variances for sub-markets
with only one shop stocking antimalarials were approximated using the average of the
variances from sub-markets with multiple shops.
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Table VI shows results for two models, the first using the HHI for private sales volumes,
and the second the HHI for private sales values. R2s were over 0.9. The first model showed
that antimalarial prices were significantly affected by the volume-based HHI, antimalarial
type, packaging, brand status, and outlet type. Higher market concentration was associated
with higher prices, with a 0.1 increase in the HHI leading to a 9% increase in antimalarial
prices. To set this in context, if submarkets were ordered in terms of HHI, a shift from the
bottom to the second quartile of submarkets would entail an average increase in HHI of
0.07, and a shift from the second to the third, an average increase of 0.25. The results imply
that these shifts would lead to average increases in antimalarial prices of 6.3 and 18%,
respectively. Being sold from a general store rather than a drug store increased the price by
33%, which may have reflected higher wholesale prices faced by the former (general
shopkeepers sourced drugs locally, while drug store owners purchased supplies in Dar es
Salaam, where prices for given products were generally lower (Goodman, 2004)). Packaging
increased the price by 45% compared with loose tablets. The price of innovator brands was
59% higher than unbranded generics, and also significantly higher than branded generics (F-
test: p = 0.049). Country of manufacture, district and outlet location were not significant. If
the sales value-based HHI were used (model 2) there was very little change in the results.
The coefficient on HHI was not significantly different from that estimated in model 1. We
explored the importance of HHI further by running four separate regressions by drug type
(SP (n = 62); amodiaquine (n = 37); chloroquine (n = 33); quinine (n = 22)). For SP, HHI
remained significant in both models 1 and 2 (p<0.001 and p = 0.002, respectively). The HHI
coefficients were higher than in the pooled models, but not significantly so. HHI was not
significant for the other drug-specific models. It was unclear whether this was because
concentration was less important in the markets for these drugs, or because of the smaller
sample sizes.
Treating sub-markets with only one shop stocking antimalarials as certainty units, rather
than approximating their variance with the average from other sub-markets made no
difference to the results. As the country of manufacture variable was not significant we reran
the regressions omitting this variable, which allowed us to include a further three
observations for which this variable was missing. There was no change to the pattern of
results for model 1 and only slight changes to model 2 (shop type was no longer significant
(p = 0.065), and district became just significant (p = 0.04)).
6. DISCUSSION
6.1. Limitations
Four potential limitations should be noted concerning data reliability and measures of
market definition and sales. Firstly, sales of quinine and artesunate tablets, SP and quinine
syrup, and all injectables were not legal in drug or general shops. Although interviewers
stressed that they were not connected with any regulatory body, antimalarial stocks may
have been under-reported. Secondly, geographical market definition was inevitably not
clear-cut. Shipment cut-off points for definition of sub-markets are essentially arbitrary, and
reflected only actual, rather than potential, utilisation patterns.
Thirdly, sales data were estimated for one private facility that declined to participate and for
the general stores not selected for the sample, based on mean sales for each category. This
may have led to an underestimation of sales variation between outlets, biasing the HHI
downwards. Finally, it is possible that extrapolation of the retail audit sales data across the
year did not fully capture seasonal variation, as malaria incidence would be expected to vary
with rainfall. Some justification for a pro rata extrapolation was provided by government
facility outpatient data, which showed average monthly visits during the 4 months
overlapping with the retail audits (February, March, June and July) to be only 3% higher
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than average monthly outpatients over the whole of 2002. Moreover, the vast majority of
outlets operated all year round in a fixed location, and stocking patterns did not appear to
vary seasonally based on comparison between the outlet censuses, outlet survey and retail
audits, which in combination spanned most months of the year.
The analysis considered horizontal integration only, though vertical integration can also
have an important influence on competition. However, in-depth interviews have
demonstrated that there was no vertical integration between retailers and their wholesalers or
distributors (Goodman, 2004). Moreover, vertical coordination was also very limited; there
were no examples of long-term contracts, product tieins, or visits by pharmaceutical
company representatives, and only a couple of shops reported receiving recommended retail
prices (RRP) from distributors.
6.2. Nature of competition
At first glance the market for malaria treatment might appear relatively competitive in
comparison with other health-care markets. The number of drug providers was high, with
one provider for every 236 people, and over 80 different antimalarial products, all off-
patent. Drug treatments were fully tradable after purchase, in contrast to inpatient care. The
agency role of the provider was relatively unimportant as consumers had a free choice of
provider and in shops were free to choose their own treatment if they wished. In addition,
rates of entry and exit were high, especially for general stores, indicating that contestability
in the retail market was relatively strong. Combined with frequent repeat purchase, almost
universal out-of-pocket payment, and the commercial orientation of most providers, one
might expect relatively strong price competition.
However, in practice antimalarial prices were found to be highly variable, and analysis of
demand revealed a strongly geographically segmented market, with the majority of sub-
markets having populations under 10 000. Concentration of antimalarial sales by provider
could be considered high. It has been suggested that where the 4-firm ratio exceeds 40%,
oligopoly is likely to occur (Scherer, 1970). In this antimalarial market even the 3-firm ratio
for private sales volumes and values was above 65% in all sub-markets. US anti-trust
guidelines state that an HHI below 0.1 is considered unconcentrated, 0.1-0.18 moderately
concentrated, and greater than 0.18 is highly concentrated (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). All
sub-markets were at or above 0.18 on the basis of private sales volumes, and all over 0.18 on
the basis of values, with some at or close to a monopoly situation.
Competition in certain US hospital markets has been argued to be characterised by models
of quality competition, where an increase in competition may result in a rise in price due to
the cost of high quality (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000). In support of this hypothesis,
many econometric studies in the 1980s found a significant inverse relationship between the
degree of concentration and costs or quality measures (Chirikos, 1992; Robinson and Luft,
1987; Robinson et al., 1988; Wilson and Jadlow, 1982), although since the introduction of
reforms such as managed-care, price competition is argued to have become more important
(Propper and Soderlund, 1998). A negative correlation between profits and concentration
was also documented in the Bangkok market for hospital services, combined with some
association between lower concentration and higher quality (Bennett, 1996). In this market
the reverse appeared to hold, with concentration and price being positively linked, as one
would expect from standard economic theory. It is possible that concentration in private
sector sales values has a larger impact on price than concentration in sales volumes, because
sales values more closely reflect turnover, profitability and commercial decisions. The
relationship between concentration and price was significant despite the relative
homogeneity of the study area; one might expect to find an even stronger relationship in a
Tanzania-wide analysis, incorporating both large urban centres and very remote locations.
GOODMAN et al. Page 10
Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 June 02.
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
However, there are a number of alternative potential explanations for the link between price
and concentration. It could be that outlets in more concentrated markets have more market
power, and are therefore able to obtain higher profit margins. It is also possible that higher
prices in more concentrated sub-markets reflected higher transport costs rather than less
intense competition, meaning that the HHI was correlated with remoteness. This was
difficult to assess as all sub-markets contained some areas on and off main roads. It was not
possible to measure profit margins directly, as data on retailer costs proved too sensitive to
collect accurately.
It is possible that the relationship between price and concentration reflected collusive
practices. The sub-markets had several characteristics conducive to the maintenance of
cartels. The number of outlets was small, and it would be relatively easy to obtain
information on competitors’ prices. In addition, retailers had ‘multi-market’ contact (Tirole,
1988), so may have avoided price cuts on particular drugs if competitors were likely to
retaliate on other products. Moreover, they may have followed norms of cooperation, rather
than competition, as observed among other African microenterprises (Fafchamps, 1994;
Tripp, 2003). Tripp notes that many of the poorest microenterprises do not appear to seek
profit maximisation, instead prioritising reciprocity, mutuality and fairness (Tripp, 2003).
6.3. Policy options
This study demonstrated that the retail sector is a major source of treatment for fever/
malaria, but that antimalarial coverage is low. The literature on treatment-seeking behaviour
shows that this is a common finding across sub-Saharan Africa. The proportion of care-
seekers using the retail sector ranges between 15 and 83%, but is often in the range of
50-70% (Goodman et al., 2007a). McCombie estimated that overall only a third to a half of
febrile illnesses were treated with antimalarials, meaning that this study’s figure of 37% is
fairly typical (McCombie, 2002).
The determinants of poor access to antimalarials are multi-dimensional, including
geographical inaccessibility and poor provider and consumer information, but in these poor
rural communities the affordability of antimalarials is likely to be a major factor, which may
in part reflect market power.
Since these data were collected the affordability constraint has tightened significantly.
Resistance has grown rapidly to SP, leading the Tanzanian government to replace it with
ACT. This reflects a common trend across the region, with ACTs being adopted due to their
high efficacy and the expectation that the use of a combination will slow the development of
drug resistance (White et al., 1999). However, ex-factory ACT prices are 20-40 times
greater than the older antimalarials such as chloroquine and SP (Bosman and Mendis, 2007).
Retail sector ACT purchases are therefore likely to be restricted to the very wealthiest
consumers only. Treatment for the vast majority of people using shops is now contrary to
the new national guidelines, with nearly all retail customers using less effective
monotherapies or no antimalarial at all (Clinton Foundation and Government of Tanzania,
2007). Some argue that encouraging widespread ACT purchase from retailers is
inappropriate due to the risk of adverse reactions and the potential impact on drug resistance
(D#x2019;Alessandro et al., 2005). However, WHO contends that targets for effective
treatment coverage are very unlikely to be reached without expanding antimalarial access
through strategies such as retail distribution (WHO, 2004).
The Arrow committee on the economics of antimalarials argued that the issue of antimalarial
affordability should be tackled head on (Institute of Medicine, 2004). They proposed heavy
subsidisation of ACT at the point of pooled supra-national procurement, and distribution
through both public and private sectors, including retailers, with the intention of achieving
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end-user prices of $0.10-$0.20. Our household data indicate that without such a subsidy high
levels of ACT coverage are unlikely to be achieved in poorer groups. Such a subsidy may
also be justified by the positive externalities related to both treating an infectious disease
effectively, and reducing the development of antimalarial resistance by using combination
therapies instead of monotherapies.
However, our data also suggest that even lower-cost monotherapies or subsidised ACT may
end up beyond the reach of most rural customers because existing levels of competition do
not ensure competitive retail prices. Strong geographical segmentation and high market
concentration appear to provide retailers with market power, which may be used to earn
substantial profits on these drugs.
Synergistic strategies must therefore accompany subsidy at source to ensure that low prices
are passed on to consumers. Evidence of a significant and positive association between
concentration and antimalarial prices suggests that decreasing concentration among
antimalarial providers could put downward pressure on prices. This could be achieved
through an expansion in the number of drug stores, or in the number of general stores
stocking antimalarials. However, the desirability of the latter is questionable: general store
staff have relatively low levels of education and lack any medical training, their storage
facilities are often inadequate, they have high stockout rates, they are not subject to drug-
specific regulatory inspections, and their high rates of entry and exit, and frequent changes
in stocking patterns, would make monitoring difficult (Goodman, 2004).
An alternative to increasing competition would be price regulation. However, this is likely to
be difficult to enforce, given the weak regulatory capacity evidenced by the high rate of
regulatory infringements in drug stores (Goodman et al., 2007b). Moreover, price regulation
requires sensitive adjustments to changes in producer costs, as if prices are set below the
competitive level, shortages are likely to arise and parallel markets with unregulated prices
will develop (Bennett et al., 1997).
An alternative approach would be the use of RRP. Although most drug manufacturers and
importers provide distributors with schedules of recommended wholesale and retail prices,
these were very rarely found to feed down to the periphery. However, RRP are widely used
for common products in general stores, such as soft drinks and cigarettes. Although strict
enforcement would not be possible, printing recommended prices on product packaging, and
publicising them widely through a mass media campaign, could put some downward
pressure on profit margins. This would be unlikely to discourage drug stores from stocking
antimalarials altogether, as treatment of fever and malaria is such a core part of their
business. However, it could be difficult to achieve RRP-adherence in the most remote areas,
where transport costs are highest.
7. CONCLUSION
This study analysed the nature of competition faced by retailers in the market for malaria
treatment in a rural area of Tanzania. It demonstrated that the market for antimalarials was
strongly geographically segmented and highly concentrated, and antimalarial prices were
positively associated with market concentration.
High antimalarial prices are likely to be an important factor in the poor quality of treatment
obtained by many caretakers. The retail sector has the potential to increase substantially the
coverage of effective malaria treatment, but this will not be achieved without affordable
antimalarial prices. An understanding of the nature of competition faced by retailers is an
important prerequisite for the design of strategies to achieve this goal.
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Table V
Definition of variables for model of the price of antimalarial tablets in shops
Variable Definition Means
Dependent variable
Log_price_AM Log of price for child’s dose of antimalarial tablets (Tsh) 5.29
Independent continuous variables
HHI volume Hirschman Herfindahl index for private sector antimalarial sales volumes by sub market 0.31
HHI value Hirschman Herfindahl index for private sector antimalarial sales values by sub market 0.38
Independent dummy variables
Antimalarial type
Chloroquine (omitted)  1 if antimalarial is chloroquine 0.22
Amodiaquine  1 if antimalarial is amodiaquine 0.24
Quinine  1 if antimalarial is quinine 0.14
SP  1 if antimalarial is SP 0.40
Type of packaging:
Loose (omitted)  1 if tablets are sold loose 0.31
Packaged  1 if tablets are sold packaged 0.69
Country of manufacturea:
Tanzania (omitted)  1 if manufactured in Tanzania 0.37
Other_Africa  1 if manufactured in another African country 0.40
Asia  1 if manufactured in Asia 0.08
Europe  1 if manufactured in Europe 0.15
Brand status:
Unbranded_generic (omitted)  1 if unbranded generic 0.25
Innovatora  1 if innovator brand 0.09
Branded_generic  1 if branded generic 0.66
District:
Kilombero (omitted)  1 if in Kilombero DSS 0.29
Ulanga  1 if in Ulanga DSS 0.07
Rufiji  1 if in Rufiji DSS 0.64
Outlet type:
Drug store (omitted)  1 if outlet is a commercial drug store 0.79
General_store  1 if outlet is a general store 0.21
Outlet location:
Market_centre (omitted)  1 if outlet is in market centre 0.55
Rural_area  1 if outlet is in rural area 0.45
Source: Outlet Survey Nov Dec 2001, HHI from Retail Audits Feb/Apr and Jun/Jul 2002.
a
Innovator brands are those first authorised worldwide for marketing (normally as a patented product); among antimalarials in this study this only
applied to Fansidar™ and Metakelfin™, both innovator brands for SP.
Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 June 02.
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
GOODMAN et al. Page 21
Ta
bl
e 
VI
O
LS
 lo
g 
lin
ea
r r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
of
 a
nt
im
al
ar
ia
l t
ab
le
t p
ric
es
 fo
r s
ho
ps
a
M
od
el
 1
M
od
el
 2
n
 
15
4;
 F
<
0.
00
01
; R
2  
0.
90
24
n
 
15
4;
 F
<
0.
00
01
; R
2  
0.
90
35
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
 er
ro
r
p 
V
al
ue
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
 er
ro
r
p 
V
al
ue
H
H
I v
ol
um
e
0.
94
7
0.
32
0
0.
00
5*
H
H
I v
al
ue
1.
02
8
0.
29
9
0.
00
1*
A
m
od
ia
qu
in
e
1.
69
8
0.
13
2
<
0.
00
1*
1.
69
0
0.
13
4
<
0.
00
1*
Qu
ini
ne
3.
49
0
0.
15
1
<
0.
00
1*
3.
45
4
0.
15
2
<
0.
00
1*
SP
1.
88
6
0.
11
7
<
0.
00
1*
1.
88
3
0.
11
7
<
0.
00
1*
Pa
ck
ag
ed
0.
45
1
0.
10
4
<
0.
00
1*
0.
42
3
0.
10
4
<
0.
00
1*
O
th
er
_A
fri
ca
0.
18
7
0.
11
6
0.
11
4
0.
15
8
0.
11
4
0.
17
5
A
sia
0.
07
1
0.
15
7
0.
65
4
0.
06
4
0.
15
7
0.
68
5
Eu
ro
pe
0.
04
0
0.
16
2
0.
80
4
0.
08
2
0.
16
0
0.
61
0
In
no
va
to
r
0.
58
8
0.
19
8
0.
00
5*
0.
55
5
0.
19
3
0.
00
6*
B
ra
nd
ed
_g
en
er
ic
0.
16
3
0.
12
1
0.
18
3
0.
14
5
0.
11
7
0.
21
8
U
la
ng
a
0.
23
7
0.
14
8
0.
11
7
0.
29
8
0.
18
6
0.
11
6
R
uf
iji
0.
17
2
0.
09
8
0.
08
4
0.
13
7
0.
09
7
0.
16
4
G
en
er
al
_s
to
re
0.
32
7
0.
12
1
0.
01
0*
0.
31
4
0.
12
2
0.
01
3*
R
ur
al
_a
re
a
0.
11
4
0.
10
5
0.
28
4
0.
08
1
0.
09
5
0.
40
1
Co
ns
ta
nt
2.
70
7
0.
16
1
<
0.
00
1*
2.
68
3
0.
15
8
<
0.
00
1*
Fi
ve
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 w
er
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 m
iss
in
g 
da
ta
 o
n 
co
un
try
 o
f m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
r t
ab
le
t s
iz
e.
 S
ou
rc
e: 
O
ut
le
t S
ur
ve
y 
N
ov
 D
ec
 2
00
1.
a E
ac
h 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n 
is 
an
 a
nt
im
al
ar
ia
l d
ru
g.
 A
s t
he
 H
H
I w
as
 m
ea
su
re
d 
at
 th
e 
su
b 
m
ar
ke
t l
ev
el
, t
he
 st
ra
ta
 w
er
e 
de
fin
ed
 a
s t
he
 su
b 
m
ar
ke
ts,
 a
nd
 te
ste
d 
w
ith
 a
n 
F 
te
st
 o
f (
14
, 3
4).
*
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
 le
ve
l.
Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 June 02.
